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TOWARD A SUI GENERIS VIEW OF
BLACK RIGHTS IN CANADA?
OVERCOMING THE DIFFERENCE-




Canada is often viewed as a bastion of racial tolerance. Its anti-racism,
enshrined even at the constitutional level, is part of the ethos of the Canadian
people. Long celebrated as a haven for racial minorities of all kinds, Canada is
often held up as a model multicultural society.' For some, Canadian
multiculturalism is, in its best form, almost "post-racial"; that is, discussions of
race are said to be practically unnecessary. Therefore explicit consideration of
where racial difference may be the basis of disparate treatment is avoided on
the assumption that merit and other neutral ways of distinguishing between and
2among individuals prevail in Canadian society. The realities of Canadian
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1. For a further discussion of multiculturalism in Canada, and particularly critiques of what
has been called the "multiculturalist origin myth" see RICHARD J.F. DAY, MULTICULTURALISM
AND THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN DIVERSITY 26-32 (2000); JOHN PORTER, THE VERTICAL
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2. See, e.g., AUGIE FLERAS & JEAN LEONARD ELLIOTT, UNEQUAL RELATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO RACE, ETHNIC AND ABORIGINAL DYNAMICS IN CANADA 37 (1996); FRANCES
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history, however, belie these claims of racial utopia, particularly as it concerns
the rights of African-ancestored persons.3 While there is no doubt that Canada
has offered sanctuary to many African-ancestored persons during times of
trouble in their countries of origin, the welcome extended to African-ancestored
persons has at times been spare and wanting, and they have always been, and to
this day remain, outsiders without the full acceptance that defines civic
membership in Canada.4
In the misguided belief that racial classifications themselves are the source
of this historic and ongoing anti-black discrimination, many of those committed
to overcoming anti-black racism rely upon what I have termed a "difference-
denial" approach to combating this problem. 5 However, it appears that this is,
at best, a misguided attempt to remedy an anti-black discrimination that is
deeply seated, long-held, and which, though significantly abated since the early
years of blacks in Canada, continues presently. The difference-denial model of
countering anti-black racism posits a goal of color-blindness, wherein all races
are equal, and all people have access to the benefits of citizenship. The
difference-denial model holds that there should be no anti-black racism because
there is no difference between black people and people of other races,
particularly those of primarily European ancestry. The problem with this view
is that it ignores the past and present status of African-ancestored persons, and
thus ultimately inheres to their continuing disadvantage.
I believe that there can only be significant progress in combating the
3. Throughout this paper, I will use the words "black" and "African-ancestored"
interchangeably to refer to people who themselves originated in or whose ancestors in significant
numbers originated from the continent of Africa. Just what to call such persons has been the
subject of some debate. It has been suggested that the transition from Negro and colored to black
and African-American or African-Canadian was as a result of the efforts by persons of African
ancestry in the 1960's to achieve a sense of racial pride. See, e.g., F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS
BLACK? 145-46 (1991).
4. A recent survey conducted by the Association of Canadian Studies indicates that when a
sampling of Canadians of all races were asked to identify those groups most discriminated against
in Canadian society, blacks were typically listed as among the most frequent victims of racial
discrimination. As to individual perceptions of racial discrimination by blacks themselves, blacks
were the racial or ethnic group who most frequently reported that that they had been discriminated
against or treated unfairly by others because of their ethno-cultural characteristics. See Jack
Jedwab, Collective and Individual Perceptions of Discrimination in Canada, Report of the
Association for Canadian Studies, July 18, 2004, available at http://www.acs-
aec.ca/oldsite/Polls/collective.pdf.
5. For further discussion of the effects of denying racial difference, see, e.g., George J. Sefa
Dei, The Denial of Difference: Reframing Anti-Racist Praxis, 2 RACE, ETHNICITY AND
EDUCATION 17 (1999). See also George J. Sefa Dei, Recasting Anti-Racism and the Axis of
Difference: Beyond the Question of Theory, 7 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 38 (2000). See generally
DONALD S MOORE, RACE, NATURE, AND THE POLITCS OF DIFFERENCE (2003); JILL VICKERS,
GENDER, RACE AND NATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2002); THOMAS R. WEST, SIGNS OF
STRUGGLE: RHETORICAL POLITICS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE (2002); GARY GERSTLE,
AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2001); ERIC KRAMER,
POSTMODERNISM AND RACE (1997); MICHAEL AWKWARD, NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE: RACE,
GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF POSITIONALITY (1995).
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Canadian brand of anti-black racism if, rather than ignoring black difference,
we embrace it and use it as the basis for making positive changes that address
inequality. One method of directly confronting difference is suggested by a
1997 article by John Borrows and Leonard I. Rotman in which the authors
explore the development of the term sui generis to describe Aboriginal legal
rights.6 The sui generis model of Aboriginal rights posits an alternative legal
model that bridges Aboriginal customs with common law customs and thereby
recognizes the unique history of Aboriginal persons in Canada and their
consequent legal position. Drawing from the work of Borrows and Rotman, in
this paper I consider the implications of replacing the difference-denial
approach with a sui generis model of black rights.7 I do this by first exploring
the parameters and limitations of the difference-denial model for countering
anti-black racism. I next discuss Borrows and Rotman's conception of the
nature of sui generis Aboriginal rights. I then describe what sui generis black
rights would entail and consider some possible critiques of sui generis black
rights. Finally, I posit how a sui generis concept of black rights may help
combat anti-black racism in Canada in a way that can not be accomplished
using the difference-denial model.
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE DIFFERENCE-DENIAL MODEL OF COUNTERING ANTI-
BLACK RACISM
The difference-denial model of countering discrimination posits that there
should be no distinctions made between people because of nationality, gender,
physical disability, language, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation or race. As it
relates to anti-black racism, the difference-denial model is a particularized
expression of the notion of the color-blind ideal.8 Under this view, difference in
6. John Borrows and Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature Of Aboriginal Rights:
Does It Make A Difference?, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 9 (1997). A number of articles discuss the
nature of sui generis rights. See generally Gordon Christie, A Colonial Reading of Recent
Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and Haida Nation, 23 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 17
(2005); Paul Joffe, Assessing the Delgamuukw Principles: National Implications and Potential
Effects in Quebec, 45 MCGILL L.J. 155 (2000); J.Y. Henderson, Interpreting Sui generis Treaties,
36 ALBERTA L. REV. 46 (1997).
7. Ian Haney Lopez has written of race as a sui generis social phenomenon. Ian Haney
Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994). I speak not necessarily of the sui generis nature of
blackness but of the sui generis nature of black rights.
8. The harms of the color blind ideal have been addressed in a plethora of articles. See, e.g.,
Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77 (2000) (arguing that color
blind discourse acts as a semantic code, and that, while color blindness may disrupt racist
practices, it often legitimizes them as it fails to take into account well-embedded legal and social
stratification). Id. at 78. Siegel writes:
Color blindness discourse may offer symbolic or expressive testimony of this society's desire to
achieve neutrality in matters of race relations, but, I argue, color blindness discourse cannot itself
generate a positive account of what race-neutrality would look like in practice. The conviction that
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the treatment of persons of African ancestry and those of other races is rejected
on the premise that there is simply no difference among the races to justify any
such disparate treatment. Indeed, at its extremes, the difference denial model
of countering anti-black racism espouses an almost radical anti-determinist
argument that since there is no race from a biological perspective and race is
merely a social construct, it should therefore hold no sway over human
interactions. 9 Clearly, some oppose the notion that race exists on a biological
level while still recognizing the very tangible reality of race that results from a
historically race-based society and years of racial discrimination.' 0 Proponents
of the difference denial model, however, follow a more pernicious line of
thinking that reduces all racial classification to an arbitrary exercise that causes
racist behavior, overlooking the necessity of current classification schemes that
rationally account for the result of racist behavior. Hence, the difference denial
model suggests that societal ills such as racial segregation, denial of
employment based on race, or racial profiling can be instantly eliminated if
distinctions between or among the races are simply ignored from here on out.
In its various incarnations, this difference denial model of anti-black
racism permeates socio-legal scholarship. Race is understood in this context as
simply "bad thinking", which should hence be eliminated from public
discourse."I In its place, many legal scholars call for a "uniracial" worldview
that focuses on the intrinsic worth and human dignity of the individual. 12 In
fact, the jurisprudence of jurists such as Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice
Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, supports the idea that
addressing past or present racial discrimination by noting the race of the
oppressed and distributing benefits accordingly is to be eschewed because of
the "the corrosive moral and practical effects of recognizing racial
distinctions." 13 Moreover, some followers of this jurisprudence may even
color blindness discourse does offer such positive, practical guidance generally reflects views
about the social nature of race that are entirely independent of the conceptual premises of color
blindness discourse.
See also Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the
Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000); Carrie Crenshaw, Colorblind Rhetoric,
63 SOUTHERN COMMC'N JOURNAL 244 (1998); Bryan K. Fair, The Acontextual Illusion of a
Color-Blind Constitution, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 343 (1994).
9. See, e.g., JOCK COLLINS, CONTEMPORARY RACISM IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEW
ZEALAND 3 (1995). See also ROBERT MILES, RACISM AND MIGRANT LABOUR 72-73 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Haney Lopez, supra note 8, at 4-20 (advocating for a model of race as a
mostly social phenomenon).
11. Lewis Killian, Black Power and White Reactions: The Revitalization of Race-Thinking
in the United States, 454 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 43 (1981).
12. See, e.g., Jonathan K. Stubbs, Implications of a Uniracial Worldview: Race And Rights
In A New Era, 5 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2005).
13. John Marquez Lundin, The Call for A Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
407, 428 (1997).
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believe that race-based remedies to discrimination "encourage patronizing
assumptions on the part of Caucasian policy makers". 14
There are several problems with this model. First, proponents of "e-
racing," or eliminating racial difference in either legal or social discourse,
ignore that there are in fact multiple concepts wrapped up in what we refer to as
race, and this becomes even more complex when the notion of blackness in
Canada is explored. Next, the difference-denial model as it has developed in
Canada appears to have been directed first and foremost at redressing the
problems of linguistic minorities and therefore has had only limited and
incidental utility in fighting anti-black racism. Moreover, even incorporation of
the difference-denial norm as applied to blacks under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms appears to afford little protection from anti-black discrimination.
Finally, the difference-denial model of countering anti-black racism has a
frightening resemblance to difference-denial racism.
A. The Various Facets of Race and of Blackness in Canada Are Not Properly
Incorporated Into the Difference Denial Model
Race has many meanings, 15 and race in the Canadian perspective has a
particular valence. It has been observed, for example, that throughout much of
Canadian history race has had a more ethnological meaning and its use was
often meant to encompass shared values and characteristics such as history,
language, religion, and politics.' 6 Indeed, in the early Canadian context, race
was frequently synonymous with "nation".1 7 At other times, race has been
associated with biology and Darwinism.' 8 It has been observed that the
meanings attributed to race grow out of myriad and often diverse social, legal,
and political discourses, and that given these multiple potential sources of
conversation about race, no single definition of race would likely be the key to
dismantling race-based harms. 19 Instead, ending race-based discrimination, and
particularly anti-black discrimination, requires continued efforts to understand
all of these meanings of race and how they function and to incorporate this
understanding into socio-legal discourse. The difference denial model focuses
its conception of race far too narrowly to accomplish this goal.
The work of legal scholar Neil Gotanda has provided a potent tool for
14. Id.
15. See generally KENAN MALIK, THE MEANING OF RACE: RACE, HISTORY AND CULTURE
N WESTERN SOCIETY (1996); PETER JACKSON AND JAN PENROSE, CONSTRUCTIONS OF RACE,
PLACE AND NATION (1993).
16. ROBERT CHARLES VIPOND, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND
THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 92 (1991).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment And The Reproduction OfInequality, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1753, 1760 (2001).
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analyzing the different facets of race by dividing the possible jurisprudential
uses of race into four categories: status-race (which encompasses the notion of
race as an indicator of social status), formal-race, historical-race (which focuses
on the past legal treatment of blacks), and culture-race (which includes the
customs, beliefs, and intellectual and artistic endeavors of blacks which are
embodied in community consciousness).2 ° More than any of the categories
proposed by Gotanda, the formal-race ideal forms the basis of the difference
denial approach to anti-discrimination. In assessing the legal rights of non-
whites, for the most part, postmodem courts and legislatures following a
difference denial model treat race solely as formal-race in which race is little
more than a neutral descriptor and has almost no independent value outside of
21its role as a descriptor.
Gotanda argues that properly remedying past and present black
oppression, however, requires addressing status-race and historical-race
22instead. To apply these terms more specifically to the context at hand, I will
refer to "status-blackness" and "historic-blackness." Status-blackness includes
ideas about the nature of blackness that the law typically relates to stereotypes,
bias, or anti-black racism. It is thus status-blackness at work when blacks are
discriminated against because of beliefs about their inherent inferiority. This
has sometimes been referred to as "racial naturalism" and has formed much of
the socio-legal landscape of decisions about black rights in both Canada and the
United States throughout most of their histories. 23 Though racial naturalism
was traditionally discredited as the product of a racist, pseudo-scientific past,
the notion of the inherent inferiority of those of African ancestry has reared its
ugly head frequently over the last several years. Indeed, some authors have
unapologetically tried to make the case for the inherent nature of black
intellectual or social inferiority.
24
Working in tandem with beliefs about black inferiority to form the
contours of status-blackness are notions of black social or legal "immaturity",
or what has been called "racial historicism" -the argument that if blacks have
been treated unfairly via-A-vis whites, and even if the mistreatment persists, it is
because collectively blacks have not yet achieved the necessities for full social
25membership. Racial historicism is usually couched in progressive terms
20. For a fuller discussion of these concepts, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our
Constitution is Color-Blind, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1991).
21. Id at 4-7.
22. Id at 7.
23. Kim Benita Furumoto and David Theo Goldberg, Boundaries of The Racial State: Two
Faces Of Racist Exclusion In United States Law, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 86 (2001).
24. See, e.g., R.J. HERNSTE1N AND CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994); PHILIPPE RUSHTON, RACE, EVOLUTION, AND
BEHAVIOR (1995); SEYMOUR ITZKOFF, THE DECLINE OF INTELLIGENCE IN AMERICA: A
STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL RENEWAL (1994).
25. Racial historicism itself has had varied bases and proponents. In this context, I speak of
the racial historicism of the white majority and its beliefs in the social, civic, or legal immaturity
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which seek to smooth over anti-black bias by asserting that such bias, while
regrettable, is only a temporary ill which will disappear as blacks develop into
"mature" members of the polity. Hence, an example of this developmentalist
approach to status-blackness which is much in currency is the opposition to
affirmative action programs that place blacks in elite educational institutions or
jobs on the premise that blacks will "suffer" because of lack of readiness. 26
Historic-blackness, on the other hand, acknowledges past and continuing
racial subordination. It is at the heart of differences in the social situation of
racial groups or their individual members that are attributable to past or current
discrimination. For many, the root of historic-blackness begins in the
enslavement of African-ancestored persons by Europeans. This has resulted in
what one scholar has called a "spoiled identity"-a stigmatization as a result of
the historical taint of slavery. 27 This spoiled collective identity is unremitting,
and undermines the possibilities for whites today to view blacks as individuals
like themselves. Even if the basis of historic-blackness is past stigma, the past
stigma is continually regenerative as blacks fall farther behind due to lack of
access to social, political, economic and legal resources. 28
Rather than address these various facets of racial identity, the difference
denial model often overlooks the complex meaning of racial classifications.
One writer whose work suggests an adherence to the difference-denial model
argues for the elimination of the word "race" as a classifier in legal discourse
entirely, suggesting that it be replaced by more precise classification terms such
as "color," "continent of origin," "national origin," and "descent from ancestors
of a particular color, national origin, or religion. ' 29 Race is defined as "an
of blacks as a basis for black oppression. However, it has been argued that black leaders
themselves have espoused racial historicist arguments that unwittingly maintained black
subordination. See, e.g., discussions of Marcus Garvey's racial historicism as evidenced by his
creation of a pan-Africanist view that rejected of African indigeneity in PAGET HENRY,
CALIBAN'S REASONING: INTRODUCING AFRO-CARIBBEAN PHILOSOPHY 208 (2000); See also
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY 143-44 (1901) (encouraging the black man to "cast
down [his] bucket" where he stood to labor among Negroes and thus dignify common labor, all
while eschewing intellectual excesses).
26. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 371-72 (2004) (concluding that affirmative action admission of
blacks to elite law schools has the effect of producing fewer black lawyers because blacks
admitted to elite law schools are often unprepared and "struggle" more than their white
counterparts), and Richard H. Sander, Empirical Studies Of The Legal Profession: What Do We
Know About Lawyers' Lives?: The Racial Paradox Of The Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1755, 1820 (2006) (arguing that "aggressive" racial preferences at the law school and law firm
level hindered rather than helped the careers of young black attorneys and could be in part
responsible for the continuing white dominance of large-firm partnerships).
27. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 67 (2002).
28. For a discussion of the application of race to economic and social resources, see, e.g.,
Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1977).
29. Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1093, 1100 (2004).
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incoherent concept that adds nothing to our understanding of human biology or
social order." 30 Hence, "the law should discontinue its use of the term " race"
because it is an unnecessary and potentially pernicious concept. ' ,3 1 This scholar
suggests that eliminating the word race may be useful in tailoring legislative
schemes for redress more closely to reach only intended beneficiaries.3 2 By this
means, one assumes, problems such as conflating all blacks with those who are
economically disadvantaged, or with those who have more visible African
ancestry and thus face greater discrimination, or with those whose immediate
ancestry is not American/Canadian and who therefore have no historic claim
for redress of race-based harms, may be avoided.33  I believe, however, that
eliminating the word race from legal discourse may just as easily have the
opposite effect.
If, instead of using race in legal discourse, legislators used various other
indicators, it would not likely lead to a winning situation for blacks and other
racial minorities. This would be particularly true in the context of crafting
legislative responses to racial discrimination. Eliminating race in favor of other
social indicators would allow zealous legislators to divide persons into
numerous "victim sub-groupings" based upon legislators' own limited notions
of the nature and scope of racial harms suffered by various persons, and thus
ignore the very real, myriad and pernicious ways in which "race" impacts upon
people both collectively and individually, without regard to their status as, for
example, rich blacks, light-skinned blacks, or Latina persons of visible black
ancestry.
3 4
30. Id. at 1098.
31. Id. at 1093.
32. Id. at 1157.
33. Id.
34. An interesting story about the extent to which race often "trumps" class is the case of
three women, two of whom are African-ancestored, who were apparently barred from accessing
town-controlled beaches in affluent Greenwich, Connecticut, where they were longtime residents.
Although in periods of low usage, such as early morning hours when the women appeared, entry
to the beach was typically not closely regulated, the group of women were challenged and then
barred because they failed to produce beach cards proving their residency status. A town official
acknowledged that racial discrimination had occurred in the treatment of the women, and offered
tips to the white athletic trainer leading the group on how to be "discreet" when bringing blacks
and thus avoid attracting the attention of beach workers who enforce usage rules. The two
African-ancestored women in the group were Sheila Foster and Migdalia Bonilla, the affluent
wives of former members of the New York Mets baseball team George Foster and Bobby Bonilla.
See Alison Leigh Cowan, Bias Seen in Expulsion at Greenwich Beach, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2005, at B4. Another incident in which race seemed to trump class was when black Toronto
attorney Jason Bogle was accosted in his Lexus by Toronto police and accused of having guns and
drugs by police on the lookout for the allegedly black killer of a young white woman on Boxing
Day (December 26) 2005 in Toronto in the middle of a busy shopping thoroughfare. According to
Bogle, the police desisted when he offered the names of high-ranking policemen that he knew, and
stated that given the "current climate", they had to perform their jobs in that manner. "Difference-
deniers" would probably not believe that such matters occur at all, and when and if they do, would
maintain that they are actually based on some other factor besides race.
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B. Difference-Denial Anti-Discrimination in Canada is Aimed at Combating
Oppression Against Linguistic Minorities and is Therefore of Limited and
Merely Incidental Utility in Targeting Black Oppression
The birth of the difference-denial model of anti-racism is often associated
with the Civil Rights era in Canada and the United States and its aftermath.
After eliminating such clear cut examples of racial inequality as separate
schools and other separate accommodations for blacks during the Civil Rights
era of the 1940's, 50's and 60's, there was a self-congratulatory sense of relief
among the North American white majority that all of the recent unpleasantness
was in the past. Explicit laws on racially segregated schools were overturned in
the provinces. 35  Progressive laws, chiefly in the form of human rights
legislation barring certain forms of discrimination, were passed in all of the
provinces and territories.3 6  The Multiculturalism Act37 , the Federal
Employment Equity Act 38 and the international human rights instruments to
which Canada has acceded also provided legal bases for combating
discrimination. However, after passage of these laws, anti-black racism in
many places remained as virulent as ever. Notwithstanding the development of
federal level and provincial human rights codes under which most private acts
of discrimination are prosecuted and which have been held to be "semi-
constitutional" in import,39 a number of discriminatory acts against blacks have
continued without significant abatement. This is because these difference
denial model laws in Canada were drafted so that the real beneficiaries would
be linguistic and cultural minorities, most typically the French-language
minority.
Even under the Canadian Human Rights Act, which ostensibly offers
blacks an avenue of recourse for any discrimination they encounter, in most
provinces, there is no possibility of directly filing their complaints with a
tribunal. Instead, complainants must first have their claims screened by a
Human Rights Commission. 40 This "gatekeeper" function often disadvantages
35. However, even after these amendments, black children were routinely turned away from
white schools, not on explicit racial grounds, but on claims such as "insufficient accommodation."
CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, COLOUR-CODED: A LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN CANADA 1900-
1950, 414 (1999) (citing In re Hunchinson and School Trustees of St. Catharine's (1871) 31
U.C.Q.B. 284 (Ont. Q.B.) [hereinafter Colour-Coded]. The Common School Act was officially
repealed in 1964.
36. From the 1962 until 1977, both the federal government and all of the provinces adopted
human rights legislation.
37. MULTICULTURALISM ACT, S.C. 1988, c. 31 (Can.).
38. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 1995 c.44 (Can.).
39. Ontario (Human Rights Comm.) and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd. (1985), 7
C.H.R.R. D/3102 (S.C.C.) (Can.); Winnipeg School Division No.1 v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150
(Can.).
40. Joanna Birenbaumn & Bruce Porter, Screening Rights: The Denial Of The Right To
Adjudication Under The Canadian Human Rights Act And How To Remedy It, available at
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences/admin05_screening.doc.
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those who should most be served by the Act, black claimants. 41 One example
of this dynamic is found in that blacks have little if any recourse to the racial
discrimination in the provision of rental housing in Canada. While every
provincial human rights code forbids such behavior by landlords or their
agents, and further bars "indirect" discrimination such as setting income limits
or refusing to rent to people on welfare, such refusals remain a common
experience among prospective black tenants. There is evidence that provincial
human rights commission employees themselves believe that such
discrimination is permissible and thus take little action in response to
complaints or even discourage complainants from filing.42 In this way, the
safety provisions that Canadian law and policy purports to offer to blacks in
danger of discrimination are in fact invalid in practice.
This is because blacks in Canada are only incidental beneficiaries of
widespread anti-discrimination policy, which was actually designed with other
groups in mind, despite the fact that anti-black discrimination is one of the most
virulent forms of discrimination in Canada. Though the scourge of explicit
racism in Canada has gradually given way to assertions of multiracial
democracy wherein racial differences are moot in the shadow of this policy, it
is not clear that this in any way reflects less dangerous treatment of blacks or
other visible minorities. Blacks remain in need of legislation to address their
unique experience, and yet this type of remedy has not been proposed as yet,
nor is it on the horizon. As Derrick Bell has pointed out in his discussion of the
United States Civil War43 and the Emancipation Proclamation 44 which ended
41. See, e.g., Mark Hart & Geri Sanson, Getting Rid of the "Gatekeeper": A Practical
Model for Human Rights Reform, available at
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences/admin05_hart.doc.
42. Id.
43. Between February and May 1861, eleven southern states seceded from the union of the
United States and formed the Confederate States of America, responding mostly to election of
Abraham Lincoln, who was known to oppose any expansion of slavery outside of already existing
slave states. In April 1861, Confederate troops fired upon federal troops at Fort Sumter, South
Carolina, hence beginning the Civil War. During the early part of the war, Lincoln was, for all
intents and purposes, a moderate on the question of slavery, and emphasized preservation of the
Union as the sole Union objective of the war. However, as the war pressed on, Lincoln adopted
the abolition of slavery as a secondary goal. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW 4 (1980).
44. Proclamation of January 1, 1863 Number 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). The Emancipation
Proclamation was a declaration first promulgated by United States President Abraham Lincoln on
September 22, 1862 and effective January 1, 1863. The proclamation provided that all slaves in
Confederate territory still in rebellion would be freed. The goal of the proclamation was not so
much to end black slavery as to disrupt the Southern economy and provide black recruits for the
Union Army, thus leading to a faster resolution of the conflict. See generally DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDfNG REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (2001); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE
CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001); JOHN
HOPE FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION (1963). See also DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 4 (1980) (citing Dillard, The Emancipation Proclamation in
Perspective of Time, 23 LAW IN TRANSITION 95 (1963)). As Bell point out, "as a legal matter, the
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United States slavery in rebel Southern states during the Civil War, "blacks are
more likely to obtain relief for even acknowledged racial injustice [only] when
that relief also serves, directly or indirectly, to further the ends which
policymakers perceive are in the best interests of the country. 45 In keeping
with Bell's observations, it may be argued that the movement towards a
multicultural model in Canada was not necessarily a reflection of greater
respect and appreciation for others such as Aboriginals, Asians, or African-
ancestored persons, whose well-being has never been perceived as crucial to
the best interest of the country. Rather, it was the burgeoning political power of
Canada's French-language minority that resulted in significant broad based
efforts to embrace cultural or ethnic difference. This is seen in the history of
the concept of "minority" in Canada, in the attention given to the "Quebec
Question" and relative inattention to the plight of blacks in Canada, and in the
embrace of anti-racism as a means of articulating "Canadianness," not as a
means of promoting the interest of blacks.
1. The Canadian Concept of Minority is Centered on Language Minorities
Rather than Racial Minorities
The concept of "minority" in Canada has been best understood as a
reference to language minorities; understanding minority to encompass visible
46
minorities such as blacks is a relatively recent phenomenon. As one observer
has written: Although one may find references to cultural and visible minorities
in recent normative discourse, the notion of minority in Canadian law has
traditionally referred to Francophone and Anglophone identities, with their
accompanying historic attachment to the Catholic and Protestant religions.47
Indeed, as a general proposition, understanding the relationship between the
majority and the minority is a relatively new concept in much of Western
48history and political discourse. As one commentator has observed: "Let us
first remember that even the very notion of minority is recent in political
history and the question of the relationship between the majority and the
proclamation freed no slaves, its terms having been carefully limited to those areas still under the
control of the Confederacy, and thus beyond the reach of federal law." Bell at 6. But see LA
WANDA Cox, LINCOLN AND BLACK FREEDOM: A STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (1981)
(arguing that ending slavery was always a primary goal of Lincoln and that any hesitation in that
regard was due to his implementation of a deliberate strategy for black freedom).
45. Bell, supra note 43, at 6.
46. See, e.g., Jean-Francois Gaudreault-Desbiens & Daniel Pinard, Les Minorites En Droit
Public Canadien, 34 R.D.U.S. 197, 199 (2003).
47. Id. Although one may find references to cultural and visible minorities in recent
normative discourse, the notion of minority in Canadian law has traditionally referred to
francophone and Anglophone identities, with their accompanying historic attachment to the
Catholic and Protestant religions.
48. Guy Rocher, Droits Fondamentaux, Citoyens Minoritaires, Citoyens Majorotaires, in
DROITS FONDAMENTAUX ET CITOYENNETE: UNE CITOYENETE FRAGMENTEE, LIMITEE,
ILLUSOIRE? 25-33 (1998).
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minority is barely more than a century old. The issue of minorities appeared
only slowly across the western history of the last century, and was mostly seen
in the last decades." 49
Defining the concept of minority in political and juridical settings could
only be slow, given the fact that the word encompassed numerous groups who
had little in common such as religious minorities, linguistic minorities, ethnic
and racial minorities. 50 In the taxonomy of minority status as it developed in
Western political and legal theory, it became clear early on that rights of racial
minorities were of little import to Western societies and had even less impact
on Western thought until relatively recently. 51 Hence, the development of
norms addressing minority concerns appears to have been little directed at
responding to collective or even individual black Canadian concerns. Rather,
the term minority has for the most part in the Canadian context been focused on
the Qu~bdcois, a group once polemically referred to as the "niggers" of
Canada. 52 Indeed, fears of social and political fragmentation of the Canadian
nation-state along the lines of linguistic identity rather than racial identity have
long been a major driver of Canadian law, politics and society.
2. Blacks in Canada Have Traditionally been Sacrificed in the Quest to Address
the "Quebec Question"
It has been asserted that one reason for the idea of federalism expressed
via the 1867 British North America Act 53 was an effort to address the long
simmering "Quebec question"-the unique cultural, juridical, and linguistic
norms of Quebec. 54 However, even the federalization wrought by the British
North America Act did little to end the tensions of the Francophone minority
and their concerns about social and legal isolation. It had become increasingly
apparent by the early twentieth century that maintaining anything resembling
an explicitly racist state could endanger the rights of minority French speakers.
This began to be reflected in the discursive practices 55 of both jurists and
49. Id. Let us first remember that even the very notion of minority is recent in political
history and the question of the relationship between the majority and the minority is barely more
than a century old. The issue of minorities appeared only slowly across the western history of the
last century, and was mostly seen in the last decades.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Joseph Heim, The Demise of the Confessional State and the Rise of the Idea of
Legitimate Minority, in MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 11-23 (1990).
52. See, e.g., PIERRE VALLItRES, WHITE NIGGERS OF AMERICA: THE PRECOCIOUS
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A QUEBEC "TERRORIST" (1971) (discussing the subordinate position of
French Canadians in Quebec and Quebec's role as a colony of both Canada and the United States).
53. BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Can.).
54. Id. at 200-03.
55. "Discursive practices" is a concept drawn from the work of Michel Foucault. See
Michel Foucault, History of Systems of Thought, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE:
SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 199, 200 (1977). Foucault applied
the terms 'discursive practices' and 'discursive formation' to the analysis of particular institutions
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legislators in cases involving claims of racial discrimination.
For example, in Christie v. the York Corporation,56 plaintiff Fred Christie,
a black man accompanied by another black man and a white man, was refused
a beer by the employees of a tavern because they had been instructed not to
serve black persons. All three of the men sued for $200 in damages based on
the humiliation they suffered at the refusal. Although Christie prevailed at the
trial level in the Quebec Superior Court,5 7 he lost on subsequent appeals to the
King's Bench58 and the Supreme Court of Canada. 59  The majority of the
Supreme Court found that the case fell under the "general principle of the
freedom of commerce" 60 and that the tavern was, when refusing to serve the
appellant, "strictly within its rights." 61 However, in a dissenting opinion at the
intermediate level of appeal to the King's Bench, Judge Antonin Galipeault
noted that if tavern owners could bar blacks, they could also deny entry to
Jews, Syrians, the Chinese, and the Japanese. He reasoned then that religion or
language might be the next grounds of exclusion, thus raising the specter of
anti-Qub6cois bias. 62  In this context, blacks become the miner's canary,
unwitting victims whose mistreatment serves as the harbinger of ills that may
ultimately harm members of other racial, ethnic, or cultural groups in Canada.
63
When not serving as bellwethers of social ills, blacks in Canada are
frequently employed as the ballast that keeps political boats afloat, to be
retained or jettisoned as the political fortunes of parties waxed or waned. A
recent example of this phenomenon has been the inclusion of blacks in Quebec
sovereignty political movements. The Parti Qu~brcois, or Bloc Qurbcois as it
is also known, has historically been an almost all white party, one of whose
principal goals has been Quebec sovereignty. 64 Blacks, immigrants and others
not of French Canadian heritage were not courted as members, and were often
seen as a hindrance to Qu~becois goals. For instance, in 1995, when the Parti
and their ways of establishing delimitations for a field of objects and the definition of a legitimate
perspective of an agent within a particular field of knowledge. Id. Discursive practices, however,
"are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical
processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms for transmission and diffusion,
and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them". Id. at 200.
56. Christie v. York Corp. (1937) 75 Que. S.S. 136 (Can.).
57. Id.
58. Christie v. York Corp. (1938) 65 Que. K.B. 104 (Can.)
59. (1940) S.C.R. 139 (Can.).
60. Id. at 140.
61. Id.
62. York Corporation v. Christie (1938) 65 Que. B.R. 104 (Que. K.B.).
63. For a discussion of the notion of blacks as an early warning system to protect against
broader societal ills, see LANI GUrNIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002) (arguing that ignoring racial
differences has failed as a social policy and that continuing in this direction can only lead all
citizens to peril).
64. See, e.g., DOROTHY WILLIAMS, THE BLACKS OF MONTREAL, 1628-1986: ESSAY ON
URBAN DEMOGRAPHY (1998).
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Qu~becois lost its electoral bid for sovereignty in a referendum,65 the loss was
blamed on "money and the ethnic vote."66 However, more recently, part of a
clear strategy to overcome the strong showing of the Liberal Party in Quebec is
to marshal the votes of Black Caribbeans, Africans, and other new
Francophone immigrants. 67 This was seen in the unprecedented election of
Maka Kotta, a Cameroonian by birth, to the House of Commons as a Parti
Qudbecois representative. Maka Kotta is said to be the first African-Qu~becois
to sit in the House of Commons. Moreover, the Bloc in 2005 nominated
several candidates of African-ancestry for district elections in Quebec in
2006. 68  Once it appeared that Quebec blacks might be shifting political
allegiance, at least one Liberal politician betrayed his anti-black bias. With the
election of Maka Kotta in Quebec, a Liberal party worker, Jean-Paul Carrier
could not restrain racist rhetoric, telling a reporter "Allez voir le negre que les
gens viennent d'6lir (Go see the negro that the people have just elected)," when
asked about the Liberal party's loss to the Bloc.
69
This attempt at outreach and inclusion of blacks in Quebec may be seen as
a positive and hopeful sign of political maturity of the Bloc Qu~becois. A more
cynical view suggests, however, that blacks are simply pawns in the political
battle between the Liberals and the Bloc. Some of this might be seen in the
furor surrounding the appointment by Queen Elizabeth II of Quebec resident
Michadlle Jean as Governor General in September 2005. Born in Haiti, Jean is
Canada's first black governor general, the representative of the British monarch
in the Canadian commonwealth, and she is thus Canada's de facto head of
state. Some observers believed that then Prime Minister Paul Martin, a member
of the Liberal Party, recommended Jean in an effort to win votes in Quebec,
given the Liberal Party's poor showing in the previous election. 70  Quebec
sovereigntists, however, reacted with vitriol at Jean's appointment.7' For them,
the appointment of Jean as Governor General was evidence of her lack of
65. On October 30, 1995, the Parti Quebecois, then comprising the Quebec government,
held a referendum on sovereignty. The referendum failed by only a narrow margin, having been
defeated by 50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. See VIVA ONA BARTKUS, THE DYNAMIC OF SECESSION
187-88 (1999).
66. This statement was made by Jacques Parizeau, a noted Quebec separatist who served as
Premier of Quebec from 1994 to 1996, on referendum night in 1995. MICHAEL LANE BRUNER,
STRATEGIES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE RHETORICAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
CONSTRUCTION 68, 84 (2002).
67. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Separatists in Quebec Seek Immigrant Votes, N. Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2005, at A3.
68. Id.
69. Liberals Can't Count on Immigrants, TORONTO STAR, July 24, 2005, at H2. Note that
while the French "negre" was historically treated as the equivalent to the English "negro" and seen
as a neutral referential for black or African-ancestored people, in recent decades negre has taken
on a more pejorative meaning.
70. See, e.g., A Gamble that May Pay offfor Martin, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 28, 2005, at A6.
71. Kathleen Harris, Dad- She Has Never Been A Separatist, Never, Never, Never, NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 28, 2005, at 5.
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political integrity, as there were allegations that Jean and her French-national
husband had been strong supporters of the Quebec sovereigntist movement.
72
On this basis, sovereigntists were among the most vociferous opponents of Jean
and they lambasted Jean publicly as a political turncoat. 73  As there was
evidence suggesting that Jean and her husband may have had some association
with sovereigntists, this reaction may have been warranted.74 However, the
almost violent reaction to Jean's appointment could equally as well have been
evidence of a patriarchal attitude in which Francophone blacks and other new
immigrants are viewed as not sufficiently Canadian and hence not permitted to
exercise their own political wills.
75
3. Anti-Racism Movement in Canada is Not Truly Designed to Assist Blacks,
but to Promote the Notion that Equality is Emblematic of Canadianess
Operating along with the growing political power of minority French
speakers that led many to eschew explicitly discriminatory legal norms was a
growing desire to articulate the meaning of "Canadianess." This entailed
distinguishing Canada from its infamously and explicitly racist neighbor to the
south, the United States, and required clear cut efforts to enunciate Canada's
unique cultural and legal heritage of equality. Meanwhile, however, blacks in
Canada were continually made the victims of discriminatory acts, and offered
no relief in the courts.
What these cases suggest is that Canadian legal discourse, while arguably
adhering to race -neutral policies promoting the freedom of the individual
shopkeeper or proprietor, had the effect of promoting racist practices. Even if
there were no official policies of de jure racism in Canada, it is the unofficial
social and legal practices, the "soft law",76 systems, which ultimately allowed
anti-Black racism to have quite as much sting in Canada as it did in the United
States.
72. Licia Corbella, GG Selection An Affront; FLQ Victim Says Pm's Appointment Of
Michaelle Jean Is An Insult To All Of Canada, TORONTO SUN, at 19.
73. Id.
74. Id. Jean appeared in her husband Jean-Daniel Lafond's 1991 film, "La mani~re negre"
along with members of the Front de Liberation de Quebec (FLQ), a radical Quebec separatist
group, and in the film Jean makes comments that may be interpreted as indicating her support for
Quebec independence.
75. See, e.g., Kathleen Harris, New Vice-Regal Must Prove Herself Critics Say, LONDON
FREE PRESS (Ontario), Sept. 25, 2005, at 14; Memo to Mme Jean: "Get Out and See the
Country", TORONTO STAR, Sept. 25, 2005, at H5.
76. Soft law consists of norms that lack the full "jurisdicity" or force of traditional "hard"
law in that they are not necessarily created or enforced by legislatures or courts. Nonetheless,
"soft law" may be equally as binding as hard law and offer the same normative content. I refer to
the conclusions of the courts in these cases as soft law because notwithstanding the fact that the
Canadian courts seem to eschew explicitly race-based legal norms, they achieve the same effect.
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C. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Anti-Discrimination NormsStill do
not Transform the Difference-Denial Model into a Useful Approach to
Combating Anti-Black Discrimination
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter the Charter) is
noteworthy for establishing anti-discrimination norms. Created by the
Constitution Act of 1982, the Charter was part of a larger set of constitutional
reforms that, among other things, adopted domestic amending powers and
recognized Aboriginal rights.77 With the advent of the Charter, difference-
denial norms persisted in post-modem anti-discrimination discourse, as it
seemingly forbade anti-black discrimination with its prohibitions on
discrimination based on race or color. 78 Proponents of the Charter hailed its
scope as going well beyond similar documents in other countries. With its
component section on equality, section 15, the Charter contained not just an
anti-discrimination provision, but it was a source of equality rights.
79
Moreover, section 15's articulation of specific grounds on which discrimination
is prohibited effectively broadened the categories of claimants. Early Charter
jurisprudence supported this notion by suggesting that grounds analogous to
those which are expressly mentioned are also included, hence enabling courts
to "read in" other grounds and thereby expand constitutional protection against
discrimination in line with the spirit of the Charter. Despite the parameters of
the Charter, it falls short as a source of broad anti-discrimination protection.
The Charter falls short on its state action requirement because the courts
have not defined state action to include state sanctioning of conduct by private
actors. Only discrimination practiced by public entities may be addressed
under the Charter. The Charter does not address discrimination practiced by
private actors, even those who invoke public entities to valorize or implement
their acts. While the United States Constitution's anti-discrimination
provisions, most notably the Fourteenth Amendment, also require "state
action," a whole separate jurisprudence has developed in the United States that
addresses "indirect" state action claims and permits Fourteenth Amendment
claims where the primary actors are ostensibly private. 8 Without similar
jurisprudence in Canada, the Charter remains too narrow to address a vast
77. PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, STUDENT EDITION, 66-7 (2004).
78. The guarantee of equality rights, found in Section 15 of the Charter, states: "Every
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), schedule B of the
Canada Act, 1982, ch. 15 sched. B (Eng.).
79. See Bruce Porter, Twenty Years of Equality Rights: Reclaiming Expectations, 23
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 145, 152-53 (2005).
80. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a private
restrictive covenant constituted state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution).
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portion of the discriminatory harms that blacks actually suffer.
The Charter also falls short as a source of anti-discrimination protection
current because of the mercurial understandings about the meaning of
discrimination in the Canadian society, which has caused the interpretation of
section 15 to vary significantly over the past several years. Until the late 1990s,
it was sufficient to show a distinction based on a prohibited ground, to establish
discrimination under the Charter. The burden then shifts to the government to
justify the discrimination. Beyond the simple assertion of disparate treatment
on forbidden grounds, more recent claimants under section 15 have been
required to show that the government's law, policy, or practice has drawn a
distinction on a ground that is either listed in section 15 or is similar and that
the distinction constitutes a "violation of essential human dignity." 81 This
change in the Charter equality jurisprudence has meant that claimants were
ultimately hindered in their efforts to bring claims. Indeed, constitutional
scholar Peter Hogg has criticized the requirement as being "vague, confusing
and burdensome to equality claimants."
8 2
Because the Constitution, in its effort to centralize power, limited certain
provincial powers and, in particular, narrowed Quebec's power to put into
place French language schools, there was significant Qu~becois discontent with
the Charter, and the Quebec Premier was the only one of the eight provinces
who rejected the reforms. 83 Subsequent efforts to address Quebec's concerns
were the subject of the Meech Lake Accord of 1987 and the Charlottetown
Accord of 1992, but neither of these succeeded in enacting the constitutional
amendments that were acceptable to all of the provinces. 84 These failures have
in part fueled the Quebec sovereignty movement. 85  The Charter's
shortcomings do not render it hollow or useless. Other provisions, like sections
16, 16.1, 17-23, protect minority rights and reinforce anti-discrimination norms.
D. Difference-denial anti-racism: The Mirror Twin ofDifference-Denial
Racism?
A final problem with the difference-denial model of anti-racism is that it
bears a frightening resemblance to what could be characterized as the
81. Law v. Canada, (1999) 1 S.C.R. 497, 502 (Can.).
82. PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, STUDENT EDITION § 57.2(b) 1101





84. Subsequent efforts to address Quebec's concerns were the subject of the Meech Lake
Constitutional Accord of 1987 and the Charlottestown Accord of 1992, but neither of these
parleys succeeded reaching the goal of enacting constitutional amendments. See, e.g., Hogg,
supra note 77, at 67-70.
85. Id.
2007] TOWARD A SUI GENERIS VIEW OF BLACK RIGHTS IN CANADA? 49
difference-denial model of racism, which has been endemic to Canadian law
and policy. Notwithstanding the long history of racism in Canada, surprisingly
few examples of widespread, systemic racism were carried out under explicitly
racist laws unlike the case in the United States. Instead, implicit racism and the
denial of the role of race has historically taken the lead in the oppression of
racial minorities.
For example, in Nova Scotia in the mid nineteenth century, segregation
was often the norm in places of public accommodation even though there were
no positive segregation laws. In the 1946, Viola Desmond, an African-
ancestored woman, was prosecuted for failing to pay the appropriate tax on a
cinema ticket. Desmond had attempted to purchase a ticket for the lower floor
of the theater, apparently unaware that that section of the theater was reserved
for whites only. When a theater worker sold her a ticket for the black
designated balcony, she refused to go and seated herself on the main floor. She
was subsequently arrested and convicted for the failure to pay the tax
associated with the downstairs seat, which, because of its slightly higher price,
had a higher tax. What was striking about the Desmond case was that the
prosecution proceeded through the trial and the appeal as if race had played no
part in the matter. 86
Anti-black immigration was another historic example of difference-denial
racism. The government did not enact a law that explicitly barred black
immigration or an anti-black head-tax, rather the laws barred blacks by silent
reference. 87 Denial of racial difference, if not the reason for anti-black racism,
has certainly been a mechanism for perpetuating it.
Given this background, the elimination of race in legal discourse, which
would be the triumph of the difference-denial anti-racism norm, would mean
not the end of racism but the end of all efforts to address racism." This is
because the difference-denial model of countering anti-black racism, like its
senior sister, color-blind ideology, allows for an eyes-wide-shut approach to the
realties of anti-black racism by adopting the norms and language of an abstract
liberalism wherein the central themes are social justice via the abnegation of
racial difference and the promotion of the individual apart from any group
attributes.
86. See CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, COLOUR-CODED: A LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN
CANADA, 1900-1950, 226-50 (1999).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND
RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (2003)
(addressing how color-blind ideology ultimately preserves racial inequality).
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1I. THE SUI GENERIS MODEL OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS PROVIDES A GUIDELINE
TO ANTI-RACIST JURISPRUDENCE
John Borrows and Leonard Rotman argue that in confronting Aboriginal
rights, courts throughout the Anglo legal system have characterized those rights
as sui generis.89 They explain that sui generis, Latin for "of its own kind or
class," connotes uniqueness or clear difference.
90
A. The History ofAboriginal Sui Generis Rights in Canada
The concept of sui generis rights was seen early on in Canadian cases
adjudicating Aboriginal rights to explain the way in which Aboriginal rights to
land, referred to as "Indian title" or Aboriginal title, differed from common law
real property rights. Citing Guerin et al. v. The Queen9 1 as the source of the
phrase sui generis, the authors explain that the Supreme Court of Canada used
the expression to encompass the notion that Aboriginal persons, because of
their historic use of land and their relationship with the European sovereigns
who held dominion over them, possessed interests in land that did not flow
from and were independent of traditionally understood common law interests.
92
This notion of Aboriginal real property rights as sui generis was later extended
to hunting, fishing, and other usufructuary rights.93 Later, there came a pivotal
moment in Canadian jurisprudence when the phrase sui generis was used more
broadly to describe all Aboriginal rights. 94 In Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia,95 Justice Lambert stated:
I am satisfied that a jurisprudential analysis of the concepts underlying
"rights" in common law or western legal thought is of little or no help in
understanding the rights now held by aboriginal peoples and now
recognized and affirmed by the common law and by the Constitution... In
short, it is not only aboriginal title to land that is sui generis, all
aboriginal rights are sui generis.
96
Since Delgamuukw, "the sui generis appellation potentially turns negative
characterizations of Aboriginal difference into positive points of protection."
97
Sui generis Aboriginal rights stem from alternative sources of law that reflect
the unique historical presence of Aboriginal peoples in North America.
98
89. John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature ofAboriginal Rights: Does
it Make a Difference?, 36 ALBERTA. L. REv. 9 (1997).
90. Id.
91. 13 D.L. (1984) 2 S.C.R. (4th) 321 (Can.).
92. Borrows & Rotman, supra note 89, at 20.
93. Id.
94. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (1997) 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 643-44.
97. Borrows & Rotman, supra note 89, 11.
98. Id. at 24-25.
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Hence, one of the ways that sui generis Aboriginal rights differ from common
law rights is that Aboriginal peoples had and continue to have their own system
of law apart from the common law system. 99 This is not to indicate that sui
generis Aboriginal rights are the only source of law for Aboriginal peoples.
Rather, sui generis Aboriginal rights represent a bridging of Aboriginal and
European legal customs.100  This bridging is not without problems, and
Borrows and Rotman identify two possible sources of challenge to their
conception of sui generis rights, which they identify as external and internal.
The external challenge may be succinctly summed up as the "Audre Lord"
query: can the master's tools be used to dismantle the master's house?' 0° In
this context, the question is whether using common law norms can deliver
justice to people who are outsiders to the system. Hence, while sui generis
Aboriginal rights may help jurists to avoid "hammering the square pegs of
indigenous laws into the round holes of conventional legal categories,"'10 2 its
use in conjunction with the common law may reinforce the larger common law
system with all of its attendant ills. 103
The internal challenge concerns itself with whether the application of
broad sui generis principles within or in conjunction with the common law may
create disadvantages for Aboriginal people. As the authors duly note, this is a
question that may be asked by any claimant under common law who seeks
relief that is in some sense a confrontation to previously understood norms.,
4
This may either be because of the identity of the claimant, the relief he is
seeking, or both.
In the case of the sui generis doctrine, history has shown that it is easily
susceptible to being used to diminish Aboriginal rights. 0 5 In addition, there
has been very little judicial guidance to explain the full nature, scope, and
application of sui generis Aboriginal rights. Most courts have confined
themselves to assertions about the analogous nature of sui generis rights to
common law and international law without clear statements as to the way in
which such alternate norms are or are not compatible. ° 6 In practice, this means
that judges attempting to apply the standard are left with a surfeit of discretion,
leaving Aboriginal claimants to the mercy of jurists who may be entirely
lacking in knowledge about Aboriginal customs or culture.' 7  Hence, sui
99. Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 28 (citing M.E. Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter:
Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences, 6 CDN. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 3, 6 (1989)).
102 Id. at 28 (citing Aboriginal Self-Government and the Crown's Fiduciary Duty: Squaring
the Circle or Completing the Circle? 2 N.J.C.L. 163, 185 (1993)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 26.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 32-33.
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generis rights are "'an empty box" which has yet to be filled with substantive
procedures and protections." 10 8 This of course leaves open the possibility that
the sui generis doctrine will result in fewer rights for Aboriginal persons, or, no
more rights than they now possess. 109
B. Despite the Challenges of the Sui Generis Rights Model, it Offers a
Promising Alternative Jurisprudential Approach
While acknowledging the problems inherent in the sui generis model,
Borrows and Rotman express confidence in the modem common law's ability
to embrace the history, value, and meaning of Aboriginal norms and
incorporate them into the common law. 10 The authors argue that the law alone
will not guide the growth in Aboriginal rights. Rather, Aboriginal rights will
be forged out of the broad confluence of "political pressure, economic
development, social recovery and the grass-roots practices of Aboriginal
rights."'"
Borrows and Rotman argue that part of the problem stems from the
Supreme Court's focus on who holds the rights as opposed to how the rights
have come to exist.' 12 The answer seems to be that the Court must focus on
grounding the sui generis rights of Aboriginal persons in their laws, traditions,
and customs because to do otherwise would lead the Court to base Aboriginal
rights on impermissible racialized stereotypes.
113
III. THE SuI GENERIS MODEL OF BLACK RIGHTS IS A FAVORABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO DIFFERENCE DISCOURSE
If sui generis Aboriginal rights are in part premised upon the existence of
a separate Aboriginal legal system, this of course presents an immediate
conundrum in arguing for the concept of sui generis black rights: if sui generis
black rights are analogous to Aboriginal sui generis rights, must they have an
independent source of law that governs them? Must blacks assert a claim of
prior sovereignty? Having come to North America from many different
African ethnic groups, at many different times, often with stops along the way,
and lacking any specific pan-African legal culture or body of laws, what is the
basis of a black claim to sui generis rights? In short, how is blackness
translated into a concrete claim about rights?
Creating a functional model of black sui generis rights is a 5-step process.
108. Id. at 33.
109. Id. (citing W.I.C. Binnie, The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the
Beginning? 15 QUEEN's L.J. 217, 221-22 (1990)).
110. Id. at 27.
111. Id.
112. Id. at36.
113. Id. at 36-37.
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The first is to acknowledge and understand the history of black presence and
black oppression in Canada. The second is to identify a source of sui generis
black rights squarely located within this longstanding and continued oppression
of blacks. Third is recognizing the opposing side of a history of black
oppression in the creation of a legal culture of African-ancestored people that
has, like the Aboriginal culture, been developed both in law and in societal law-
like practices and has both internal and external components and is thus a
second source for identifying sui generis black rights. Fourth, these sources
must be utilized to locate the exact parameters of sui generis black rights. Fifth,
the possible challenges and critiques of the model must be addressed so as to
strengthen its viability as a jurisprudential approach.
A. The History of the Oppression of Blacks in Canada
The presence of blacks in Canada has been documented as early as 1608,
when blacks first arrived as slaves. 114 However, from their early history in
Canada, blacks have been counted among the "non-canonical" people-those
who were not part of the European-ancestored white majority. 115 From their
beginnings as slaves to their continuing residence in segregated, inadequate
housing 116 and attendance at failing, underserved and often segregated
schools" 17 to their disparate treatment in employment" 1 8 and the criminal justice
system,"19 blacks have had a qualitatively worse experience in Canada than
114. COLIN A. THOMSON, BLACKS IN DEEP SNOW: BLACK PIONEERS IN CANADA 95 (1979).
115. RICHARD J.F. DAY, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN DIVERSITY
30 (2000).
116. Visible-minority residents of large Canadian cities are increasingly concentrated in
neighborhoods where many of the same ethno-racial group live, and this is particularly true of
people of African ancestry. While those arriving recently are more likely to live in such
neighborhoods than those arriving 10 or 20 years ago, the odds of living in such a neighborhood
do not decline even after being in Canada for 10 to 20 years. However, because of relatively small
numbers of blacks in Canada, black segregation does not approach the black/white segregation of
many United States urban areas. See Feng Hou, Recent Immigration and the Formation of
Visible Minority Neighborhoods in Canada's Large Cities (Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies
Branch, Research Paper Series 2004), available at
http://www.statcan.ca/bsolc/english/bsolc?catno= 11F0024M20040007442.
117. CLAYTON JAMES MOSHER, DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL 96-98 (1998).
118. According to the 2002 report of the African Canadian Legal Clinic, blacks in Canada
were far less frequently employed in professional capacities than other visible minorities, and on
the average earned at most only 80% of the income that white Canadians earned on the average.
African Canadian Legal Clinic, Anti-Black Racism in Canada: A report on the Canadian
government's compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (2002).
119. Despite their relatively small numbers in Canada, African-ancestored persons are vastly
over-represented in police stops, arrests, and in criminal convictions. According toCorrections
Canada, Blacks constitute 7% of inmates, while representing only 2% of the province's
population. Shelley Trevethan & Christopher J. Rastin, A Profile of Visible Minority Offenders in
the Federal Canadian Correctional System, Research Branch Correctional Service of Canada,
June 2004, available at http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/rl44/rI44_e.shtml#LinkTarget 24738. See, e.g., David M. Tanovich,
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European-ancestored Canadians and often even worse than other racial
minorities. What accounts for this treatment of blacks? Two frequently
posited reasons are the fear and hatred of starkly visible racial difference
between blacks and whites, and the white belief in black moral and intellectual
inferiority.
While it is true that proximity to whites in North America had often
resulted in creating a number of African-ancestored persons who assimilated
European ways, such persons were by no means fully assimilated into white
society. This is true notwithstanding the fact that throughout much of their
early history in Canada, African-ancestored persons shared many of the cultural
attributes of their white counterparts: they spoke English or French, they were
Christians, they served as soldiers in every Canadian conflict, and they were
not "exotic or inscrutable in their dress, diet or religion."' °20 The only clear
distinction between African-ancestored Canadians in the early years of the
country and European-ancestored Canadians was color, and this color
difference alone was often cited as the reason for white bias.' 21 While color
prejudice was a basis for disparate treatment of blacks, there was also
widespread belief in baneful stereotypes about blacks, and in the innate
inferiority of blacks. Blacks were said to have "defects of character" 122;
exemplary of which were their "animal passions,"' 123 "inherent laziness,"' 124 and
"lack of willpower." 125 Moreover, blacks were held to be "deeply
superstitious"' 126 and possessed of "not keen imaginations",' 27 with "no strict
regard for the truth."' 128 Finally, blacks were believed to be the source of
mounting racial tension in the United States in the decades after the Civil War,
and many Canadian whites believed that the way to avoid such problems in
Canada was to adopt a policy of limiting black presence in Canada. 129 Such are
only a few of the reasons that have been asserted over the years to justify anti-
Stop In The Name Of The Law: What Law? Racial Profiling And Police Practice In Canada: E-
Racing Racial Profiling, 41 ALBERTA L. REV. 905 (2004); See also David M. Tanovich, Using
The Charter To Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based Conception of
Arbitrary Detention, 40 OSGOODE L.J. 145 (2002).




123. Id. at 126.
124. Id.
125. NINETTE KELLEY & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE MAKING OF THE MOSAIC: A HISTORY
OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 154 (1998).
126. Mosher, supra note 117, at 87 (citing H.G. Delesser, The West Indian Negro of Today,
CANADIAN MAGAZINE 15, 115-21 (1900).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. HAROLD TROPER, ONLY FARMERS NEED APPLY: OFFICIAL CANADIAN GOVERNMENT
ENCOURAGEMENT OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES 55 (1972); See also ROBIN
WINKS, THE BLACKS IN CANADA: A HISTORY 298 (1971).
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black racism, in Canada. As a result of such disdain for blacks, there were a
number of measures put into place to keep their numbers in Canada low.
Though, in the immediate aftermath of the United States Civil War and in
the decades that followed, over 30,000 blacks left Canada for the United States
(reducing the black population of Canada from over 50,000 in 1860 to
approximately 17,000 in 1911), and though only 444 blacks entered Canada
from 1904-1910, there was evidence of vigorous opposition to further black
immigration to Canada.130 Beginning in the early 1800's, there were calls for
restrictions on black immigration from the Maritime Provinces all the way to
Vancouver. 13  Blacks were frequently turned back at border crossings, and
there was even talk of establishing a head tax on blacks (such as had been
placed on Chinese entrants to Canada) or barring blacks from entering the
country altogether. 132
In 1911, a federal act barring black immigration was, in fact, passed;
however, this act was shortly thereafter repealed, apparently as a result of
concerns that it was such an unambiguous statement of anti-black prejudice that
it potentially harmed Canada's image within the international community as a
haven for blacks, and upset a small but politically active group of black voters
in Nova Scotia and Ontario. 133 In the end, black immigration continued to be
limited by informal bars in the form of medical and character examinations at
entry points. 134 In 1952, the Canadian Immigration Act explicitly reaffirmed
that entrants to Canada could be barred from Canada because of their national
or ethnic origins, habits, customs or "modes of life", and the immigrant's
unsuitability with regard to Canada's climate or perceived inability to become
readily assimilated into Canadian society.' 35 It was not until the 1960's that
African-ancestored persons once again began to enter Canada in significant
numbers, as a result of the changes wrought by the Immigration Act of 1967.136
130. Mosher, supra note 117, at 90.
131. Id. at 91-92.
132. Id. at 92-93.
133. Id.
134. COLIN A. THOMSON, BLACKS IN DEEP SNOW: BLACK PIONEERS N CANADA 75 (1979);
see also Stewart Grow, The Blacks of Amber Valley: Negro Pioneering in Northern Alberta, 6
CANADIAN ETHNIC STUDIES 17-38 (1974).
135. IMMIGRATION ACT, R.S.C. 1952, ch. 325 (Can.).
136. The 1967 policy amended the 1952 Immigration Act by establishing a "point system"
for the selection of immigrants that ranked independent immigrants according to their age,
educational attainment, employment skills, language skills and financial resources or social
resources such as already present family members. The goal of the point system was to create a
more equitable selection system that met the needs of the Canadian economy. See THE WORLD
IN A CITY 396 (PAUL ANISEF & MICHAEL LANPHIER EDS., 2003); See also DARKENING THE
COMPLEXION OF CANADIAN SOCIETY: BLACK ACTIVISM, POLICY-MAKING AND BLACK
IMMIGRATION FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO CANADA, 1940s- 1960s (1994).
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B. Oppression as a Source of Sui Generis Black Rights
The proposal that the historic oppression of blacks is the first source of sui
generis black rights may be described as just what conservative advocates of
color-blind ideology eschew: a notion of rights founded on black victimhood
status. Let us suppose for a moment that this is the essence of my proposal.
First, it can be seen that this is not as distinct from the Aboriginal model of sui
generis rights that Borrows and Rotman propose as it may appear. Next,
whites themselves are not loath to claim rights, and especially property rights,
in victimhood status. This is evident in much of the United States jurisprudence
surrounding the so-called reverse discrimination cases, which accord rights to
innocent white victims who decry what they believe are ill-founded
redistributions of rights to which they themselves are entitled based on merit.'
1 37
Generally speaking, affirmative action programs in Canada have a strong
footing, principally because Canadian Courts have the constitutional authority
to uphold such programs. 138 While Canadian equity jurisprudence thus far has
not clearly recognized "reverse discrimination" claims unless litigants
demonstrate a history of disadvantaged treatment, 39 there remains the
140possibility that they will do so. Therefore, the groundwork already exists in
Canadian jurisprudence to allow forms of victimhood status to provide the
basis for legal rights.
While the sui generis rights discussed in the Borrows and Rotman article
are said to lay partly in the proto-legal norms of the Aboriginal peoples of
137. One of the arguments that the United States Supreme Court has invoked as a reason to
invalidate racial affirmative action programs is that such programs interfere with the individual
rights of the whites who are burdened by affirmative action designed to help blacks or other racial
minorities. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 256, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (considering burden on innocent whites in equal protection context);
cf United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (considering burden on
innocent whites in Title VII context).
138. Section 15(2) of the CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS protects programs that seek
to address societal inequities caused by race prejudice of other impermissible discrimination from
challenges brought under section 15(1) of the Charter. Section 15(2) provides: "Subsection (1)
does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions
of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race,
national ot ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom), Kathleen E. Mahoney,
The Constitutional Law of Equality in Canada 44 ME. L. REv. 229 (1992); John Hucker, Towards
Equal Opportunity in Canada: A New Approaches, Mixed Results 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 841 (1995).
139. BRUCE ZIFF, UNFORESEEN LEGACIES: REUBEN WELLS LEONARD AND THE LEONARD
FOUNDATION TRUST 156 (2000).
140. See Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Pre-commitments to Gender Affirmative
Action in the European Union, Germany, Canada and the United States: A Comparative
Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 27, 47 (2003). The author cites the case of Law v. Canada,
(1999) S.C.R. 497, 540 (Can.) for an indication that the Canadian Supreme Court may yet
recognize a "novel" discrimination claim or one growing out of discrimination against usually
advantaged groups.
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North America, it is important to acknowledge that the sui generis model of
Aboriginal rights as it was earliest seen in Anglo jurisprudence (not by name
but by effect) was based on an understanding of Aboriginal peoples as being
inferior to whites and, hence, outside of English common law norms.
Accordingly, Aboriginal rights, particularly Aboriginal real property rights,
were of a lesser quantum than those normally accorded under the English
common law. This was not necessarily because of differing Aboriginal legal
understandings about the nature of land ownership. It has been frequently
asserted that one of the decisive reasons for decisions like the one in the case of
Johnson v. M'Intosh was that the Aboriginal people in question used the land
"differently" than Europeans and did not make "full" claims to land as did
Europeans under Western legal systems.' 41 However, it does not require a
particularly close reading of the case of Johnson v. M'Intosh to understand that
race was a salient factor in the decision.
While both the plaintiff and the defendant were white in Johnson v.
M'Intosh, the problem with the plaintiffs claim was that his title had flowed
from Aboriginal persons, and Aboriginal land use, because it was shared and/or
transitory, could not be viewed as encompassing the same rights as common
law land ownership. In fact, Johnson v. M'Intosh runs counter to common law
norms by claiming to look at the subjective beliefs of the Indians regarding
land use (assuming that this was in fact what the Indians believed) rather than
relying upon the common law norm that would look to the objective
manifestations of ownership to understand how to view the land claim. 142 But
that is just the point-the Aboriginals in Johnson v. M'Intosh had sui generis
rights not because they had their own legal system or system of land ownership,
but because their "savage" nature placed them outside the full contemplation of
the English legal system. The Aboriginals in Johnson v. M'Intosh were "in a
state of nature" and had never been "admitted into the general society of
nations."' 143 The Aboriginals did not create their "difference"-the whites did.
So, if anything is now due to the Aboriginals under a positive view of sui
generis rights, these claims lay as much, if not more, in the redress owed for
years of oppression created by the sub-legal status engendered by white racism
as they do in theories under some alternative legal system.
The notion of rights based on oppression rather than on the notion of prior
occupancy or sovereignty has been discussed before, and even in the context of
Aboriginal people. For example, one commentator has observed that the
rationale of prior occupancy is often a proxy for historic wrongs, and, as such,
141. 21 U.S. 543 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson].
142. Generally, in common law regimes, property was defined objectively via judicial
decisions or legislation. Herbert Hovenkamp, Private Property and the State, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 109, 111 (2003).
143. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 567.
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is a "crude marker" for addressing issues of individual or collective identity.
144
I would add that the prior occupancy and sovereignty rationales are equally as
inadequate for addressing the legal rights of a collective group. Moreover, it
has been pointed out that "sovereignty" has more than one meaning.
References to Aboriginal prior sovereignty often hearken back to pre-European
governmental institutions in the Americas, entities with presumably all of the
rights and powers of independent nation states. 45 However, it is abundantly
clear that, with regard to discussions of Aboriginal persons in the Americas,
current notions of sovereignty refer to a less encompassing meaning.
Sovereignty in the Aboriginal context has typically come to mean collective
legal or political autonomy within a nation state.
146
Finally, while the court in Johnson v. M'Intosh acknowledged that the
"Indian nations" had, in the instance of that case, conducted negotiations and
made treaties with the British (and later with the United States), this was not
cited as evidence of their existence as a sovereign nation. Rather, the
negotiations and any treaties resulting from them were viewed as exemplary of
their "dependent condition." 147 According to the court in Johnson v. M'Intosh,
the acquisition of territory via treaty was not a transaction between equals.
Such accords arguably had little legal status given that Aboriginal territory was
considered terra nullius.148  The British government (and its successors in
interest in North America) laid claim to Aboriginal land by right of settlement
of "an unoccupied territory lacking any other comparable political entity to
contest the claim." 149 The notion of treaties as evidence of sovereign rights was
effectively dashed in both Canada and in the United States by the abrupt end of
land cession treaties with Aboriginals in both nations. In Canada, for example,
while land cession treaties accounted for approximately one half of the national
territory, the last territories added - British Columbia, Northwest Territories,
Northern Quebec, and the Inuit and Yukon areas - were attained by Canada's
unilateral action.
50
In applying these principles to a sui generis model of black rights in
144. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1333-34(1993).
145. Id. at 1346-47.
146. Id.
147. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 568.
148. Terra nullius is a Latin phrase deriving from Roman law meaning "empty land" or "no
man's land." Modem applications of the term stem from pre-Enlightenment doctrines describing
land that was unclaimed by a sovereign entity recognized by European sovereigns as land that was
not owned at all. See, e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS ON
RACE STATE& NATION 1-15 (1997).
149. Neal Ferris, Between Colonial and Indigenous Archaeologies Legal and Extra-Legal
Ownership of the Archaeological Past in North America, available at
http://www.adamsheritage.com/articles/ferris_2004.htm.
150. Siegfreid Weissner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative
and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 66-67 (1999).
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Canada, it is not an obstacle that black Canadians are a heterogeneous group,
with no independent sovereignty prior to their Canadian citizenship. Instead,
their mere history of oppression within Canada itself demonstrates that they
have historically been treated differently by the legal system than other
Canadian citizens. This disparate treatment, in and of itself, and the need to
accord redress for its ill effects, can form the basis for sui generis black rights
within contemporary jurisprudence.
C. The Sui Generis Legal Culture of African-A ncestored Persons
Historically, African-ancestored persons in Canada and indeed, in all of
North America, have had no collective nationality nor any explicit territory
upon which to base claims of sovereignty. A possible exception to this is what I
will call "post-occupancy" territorial sovereignty claims. Dating from the
United States Civil War, there were calls for African-ancestored persons to be
given their own states; many blacks took up this cry. 151 A number of sources
have suggested that the Pacific Northwest of the United States and the Pacific
regions of Canada were at one time envisioned as "white man's country," with
sovereign claims based upon notions of white supremacy, and from which
blacks, Asians, and Aboriginal people would be excluded. 152 There were also
efforts towards achieving territorial sovereignty for African-ancestored persons
outside of North America. 153 From the 1700's onward in both Canada and the
United States there were various movements whose goal was to "repatriate"
freed blacks and former slaves to communities in Africa. In Canada, a
substantial number of the persons who went to Africa on such schemes were
"black Loyalists," early black inhabitants of Nova Scotia who sided with the
British Crown in the American Revolution, moved to Canada after the
American victory, and some years later joined the exodus to Africa. 154
However, blacks in Canada, like blacks in the United States, have nonetheless
sought to form what has been called "a black nationality": a pan-African
identity that encompassed a sense of self-knowledge, autonomy, freedom and
safety. 155 It is this positive identity of black Canadians as their own entity - the
opposing side of their identity as defined through oppression - which forms the
second ground for defining a sui generis model to black rights in Canada.
This is actually true for both Canada and the United States as it has
become increasingly apparent that the rhetoric of liberty and inclusion at the
heart of both nations' founding was not meant to include African-ancestored
151. See, e.g., PHILIP F. RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 157 (2001).
152. PETER WARD, WHITE CANADA FOREVER: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward
Orientals in British Columbia (1990).
153. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 120.
154. Id.
155. FLOYD J. MILLER, THE SEARCH FOR A BLACK NATIONALITY: BLACK EMIGRATION
AND COLONIZATION 1787-1863,49-51 (1975)
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persons. Because of relatively low numbers, the Canadian presence is
particularly problematic, as blackness in Canada as a historical presence is a
"threatening invasion into the national imagination."15 6 Canadian blacks "are
an absent presence always under erasure... Canadian blackness is a bubbling
brew of desires for elsewhere, disappointments in the nation and the pleasures
of exile."'
157
D. What Would Sui Generis Black Rights Entail?
Characterizing black rights as sui generis would mean a number of things.
First, it would clearly articulate the threat inherent for African-ancestored
persons in the universalizing notions of the Canadian multiculturalist mantra.
The universalizing norms of Canadian multiculturalism carry with them the
threat of destruction for black identity, as the "universal" take on particularist
and racist features empowers elites to selectively disseminate the norms of
social and legal inclusion.' Next, it would call for an explicit recognition of
the past and present oppression of blacks in Canada. Then, just as in the case
of Aboriginal persons, it would mean recognizing that blacks in Canada, due to
the burdens created by white racism, have always existed on the margins of
society and have, in almost every case, received less of all of the good things
that Canadian society has to offer. Since the arrival of blacks in Canada, the
relationship between Canada's blacks and the majority ruling class has been
one where blacks are shuttled to the sidelines.
Finally, in counter-distinction to Aboriginal sui generis rights, sui generis
black rights would grow, not from indigeneity, territoriality, and the nationhood
that grows from them, but rather from the very unrelenting nature of black
exogeneity. Blacks in Canada and in most of the Western world are permanent
foreigners.1 59 All of this would mediate for laws that take into account the
meaning of blackness in Canada, for judicial processes and norms that are
explicitly aware of the sui generis nature of black rights, and for a set of
remedies that unflinchingly address black oppression.
E. Critiques of Sui Generis Black Rights: The Challenges
Like the sui generis Aboriginal rights as described by Borrows and
Rotman, sui generis black rights are subject to a number of critiques. First
156. ERIN MANNING, EPHEMERAL TERRITORIES: REPRESENTING NATION, HOME, AND
IDENTITY IN CANADA 68 (2003).
157. RINALDO WALCOTT, BLACK LIKE WHO? (1997).
158. Monique Guillory & Manthia Diawara, From this Ivory Tower: Race as a Critical
Paradigm in the Academy (A Discussion in Two Acts), in SOUL: BLACK POWER, POLITICS, AND
PLEASURE 297 (1997).
159. See, e.g., Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky Magic: Blacks as Immigrants and the
Paradox of Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85 (Fall 1999).
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among the critiques is the difficulty of construing Canadian blacks as being
possessed of some uniform identity that yields a separate, almost sovereign-like
claim to autonomy or legal identity. Only once this is overcome can we reach
the question of whether ceding to common law norms will undermine black
rights. Are African-ancestored persons indeed so distinct from other racial
groups that they can be said to merit the special consideration of altered
common law norms? Moreover, if they are sufficiently different, does this
apply to all African-ancestored persons? An additional concern is whether
according such rights would "overprivilege" blacks, and defy general notions
of fairness. Then, assuming that these challenges are met, there arises the
matter of nationalism and the "Woman Question": how would black sui generis
rights take account of gender? The final challenge in this context resembles
that raised to sui generis Aboriginal rights-the tainted history of sui generis
black rights in North American jurisprudence.
1. Uniform Black Canadian Identity?
Is there a uniform black socio-legal identification across Canadian
African-ancestored communities? One may well wonder, given the disparate
background of such persons. There are estimates that of the over 600,000
blacks in Canada, seventy percent are of Caribbean or Bermudan ancestry, and
over 200,000 alone are of Jamaican ancestry. Over forty percent of Canadians
of African ancestry were born outside of Canada. In light of these demographic
differences, it is tempting to diminish the potential for black solidarity with the
claim that so many disparate cultures make black social, legal, or political
kinship an unlikely event. However, this assumes that somehow "culture" is
the deciding factor is assessing the existence of black communities, or that
heterogenous cultures cannot band together in exchange for more substantial
civil rights for all black Canadians.
a. Who is Black?
Although the question of just who is black is complex, involving myriad
political, sociological or cultural differences, ultimately the uniformity of black
social identification throughout the black diaspora is by virtue of the fact that a
black person is viewed as distinct because of appearance, ancestry, or both, and
not because of any commonality in culture."'160 Black ancestry as evidenced by
appearance is at the heart of much of the disparate treatment of blacks, and
hence, it is visible black ancestry that would be at the center of claims of sui
generis black rights.
While the question of black identity was relatively easy to answer in the
160. Tanya K. Hemandez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in An Era Of
Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 111-12 (1998).
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very early days of black presence in North America when there was little racial
mixing, the question has become increasingly complex once mixed race
children were bom in unions between blacks and whites or Aboriginal persons
and blacks. In the United States, one response to the dilemmas of black identity
was the development of the "one-drop" rule-any known African ancestry in a
person meant classification as a black person, regardless of appearance.161 The
one-drop rule of black racial identity arose as early as the 1600s in the
Chesapeake region of the United States in order to account for the offspring of
black slaves and white indentured servants. 62 At first, the idea was rejected
both by popular culture and the law; in some places, persons with as much as
one-fourth African ancestry were legally white.1 63 However, as the 1 9th century
was ending, the one-drop rule became increasingly accepted in the southern
United States. By World War I the rule's acceptance had spread throughout the
United States, as it was made statutory and enforced in many states.
164
To some, the term is synonymous with the concept of "hypodescent,"
meaning that Americans who look slightly African are considered Black, even
if their African heritage is less than 50 percent.' 65 The one-drop rule was
codified in a number of state statutes that purported to define racial identity
based on percentage of white, Native American, or African ancestry."' While
there are few explicit articulations of the definition of blackness in Canada, the
one drop rule seemed to be functionally the norm there as well.
167
Unlike the United States' focus on genealogy, Canadian whites identified
blackness primarily based on coloring. Arguably, this is the foundation of the
designation "visible minority" for Canada's non-white others. 168 White society
defined blackness; only those blacks whose appearance least betrayed African
heritage had a personal choice of racial designation. Those of African ancestry,
161. FRANK W. SWEET, THE DESTRUCTION OF LOUISIANA CREOLES (2000). The one drop
rule may also have variant meanings. It sometimes refers to the United States folkloric belief that
persons with even very small amounts of African ancestry are marked by some subtle yet tangible
physical trait. This has been described as the "stain" of black ancestry.
162. MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT ISSUES, CONTEMPORARY
VOICES 103 (Peter Kivisto & Georganne Rundblad, eds., 2000).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Marvin Harris, Referential Ambiguity in the Calculus of Brazilian Racial Identity, in
AFRO-AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY 75-86 (1970); MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE
AMERICAS 37 (1964).
166. Id.
167. See also CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, COLOUR-CODED (1999) (citing Fourth Census of
Canada, 1901, Vol. 1): The whites are of course, the Caucasian race, the reds are the American
Indian, the blacks are the African or Negro, and the yellows are the Mongolian (Japanese and
Chinese) But only pure whites will be classed as whites; the children begotten of marriages
between whites and any other races will be classed as red, black or yellow, as the case may be,
irrespective of the degree of colour.
168. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT, S.C. 1995, ch. 44 (Can.).
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choosing whiteness often experienced the psychological pain of "passing"
because, assuming a white social identity required forsaking all ties in the black
community. 169
With the advent of the black civil rights movements in North America,
formal race definitions vanished. Nonetheless, social and legal racial identities
in the United States-and to a lesser extent in Canada-continued to rely upon
variations of the one-drop rule. Within the last decade or so there has come a
push for greater reliance on self-identity; emphasizing theories of racial identity
that extend well beyond appearance. However, the very possibility of racial self
selection illustrates the complexity and uniqueness of blackness, for it has been
frequently observed that many other racial and ethnic groups require additional
commonalities beyond self identification to determine group status.
Despite the majority's reliance on arcane rules, black identity is often
viewed as a function of culture and custom as well as of appearance. However,
this has not meant that persons without an "authentic" claim to blackness may
"adopt" black culture and become black. Nor has it meant that phenotypically
black persons may opt out of black identity. Rather, the acknowledgement of
cultural practices serves as a second-tier test to identify whether an individual
follows expected norms. At the end of the day, being black in Canada, as in the
United States and most Western countries, is about appearing black.
b. Essentialism and Black Exceptionalism when used strategically can be a
source of strength, rather than weakness, for a sui generis model
Assuming that there is some unifying sense of black Canadianess
necessarily entails confronting the problem of essentialism and black
exceptionalism. I believe that neither problem need undermine black sui
generis rights. This is because under a difference denial model, essentialism
and exceptionalism are seen in only a very narrow light, which undermines
black rights and racial equality. The sui generis model, however, turns these
concepts around by strategically employing them as a prism for honestly
identifying the concerns of the black community.
Essentialism, the belief that people or phenomena have properties that are
essential to what they are, plays a prominent role in group identity, particularly
when the organizing principle is race or gender.' 70  Some writers have
169. It has been suggested that Viola Desmond, a heroine of Canadian black rights who
brought suit when she was ejected from a theater because of race, did not set out to be a racial
leader. Rather, it has been suggested, she was simply trying to "pass" as white when she asked for
a ticket in the section of the theater typically accorded to whites. See Constance Backhouse, The
Historical Construction of Racial Identity and Implications for Racial Reconciliation, Paper
Commissioned by the Department of Canadian Heritage for the Ethnocultural, Racial, Religious
and Linguistic Diversity and Identity Seminar (2001).
170. See, e.g., KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: VISIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN
FEMINIST THEORY 81 (1993) in which the author envision essentialism as having multiple
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suggested that essentialism, even that found in so-called empowerment
movements such as pan-Africanism or Negritude, is a bow to oppressors in
focusing on the minority group's oppressor as a negative point of comparison
for the minority group. Therefore, essentialism may be rife with the danger of
self-limitation and false self-concept rather than a purely liberating concept.1
7 1
While it is true that essentialist constructs may "mask relations of power",
talking about race, culture or gender in an essentialist way may in fact be
empowering. 172 Use of essentialism in the cause of African-Canadianess may
be an exercise in what has been called "strategic essentialism."' 73 Strategic
essentialismdiffers from regular essentialism in two important respects: first,
definitions are generated internally and essential attributes are defined by the
group itself, not by external hegemonic forces. Second, in strategic essentialism
there is no denial that the essential attributes are in fact a construct. Rather,
traditional signifiers of racialized identity are inverted and used to undermine
discourses of oppression. 174 Moreover, members of the group maintain the
power to decide when the attributes are essential and when they are not. In this
way, strategic essentialism can be a powerful tool for shaping socio-legal
identity.
Black exceptionalism refers to the notion that the black experience in the
New World is inherently distinct from other racial groups in social, legal,
political, cultural and economic factors. 75 Exceptionalism frequently posits
that blacks are outside of the norm, and hence, are in need of specially tailored
responses to their problems. In post-modem difference-denial discourse, such
claims are anathema, and are frequently discounted as "playing the race
card"-raising the issue of race, particularly the issue of blackness, in a context
wherein it is irrelevant, unfair, or obfuscating in order to obtain some political
or social advantage.' 76 Black exceptionalism, being thus closely linked with
playing the race card, has become discredited as a racial discourse. However,
like black essentialism, black exceptionalism need not be crucified as a
components: one is essentialism per se, which "attributes women's psychological and social
experiences to fixed and unchanging traits resident in women's physiology or in some larger order
of things." Id. Another meaning of essentialism offered by Ferguson is a "universalizing move
that takes patterns visible in one's own time and place to be accurate for all." Id. 81-82.
171. EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 16 (1994).
172. SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE 21 (1998).
173. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS 205 (1987).
174. LISA NAKAMURA, CYBERTYPES: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET
128 (2002) (citing LISA LOWE, Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American
Differences, Diaspora Vol. 1, No. 1 39 (1991)).
175. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and
the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997) (wherein the authors originate the
phrase "black exceptionalism").
176. See generally LINDA WILLIAMS, PLAYING THE RACE CARD: MELODRAMAS OF BLACK
AND WHITE FROM UNCLE TOM TO O.J. SIMPSON (2001). For a discussion of playing the race card
in the criminal law context in Canada, see AARON DOYLE, ARRESTING IMAGES: CRIME AND
POLICY IN FRONT OF THE TELEVISION CAMERA 40-42 (2003).
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dishonored dogma on the cross of neo-liberalism. What is needed is honest
dialogue which centers on the predominant experience in North America that
being black is different. In that view, black exceptionalism is not a variant of
playing the race card. That card is already on the table in most games that
matter.
2. The Risk of "Over-privileging" Blacks, and Other Aspects of "Fairness"
Discourse
One of the concerns frequently raised when the notion of a clearly
articulated set of specifically black rights are proposed is whether the existence
of such rights "over-privileges" blacks at the expense of the white majority and
even other oppressed people. This raises issues concerning what has been
termed "fairness discourse."' 77 Fairness discourse based purely on legitimacy
assumes that sui generis black rights would mean the creation of new rights
superseding the rights of others. However, the concept of black sui generis
rights is about rights recognition, not rights creation, and therefore sui generis
rights actually embody fairness and equality rather than undermine them.
The notion of fairness is generally seen as having two principal parts:
legitimacy and distributive justice. 178 Legitimacy relates to formal equality
andto procedural fairness. It assumes a broad neutrality under which all persons
are similarly situated, and in doing so, states a preference for rules that are clear
on their faces and easily administrable. In contrast, distributive justice is based
on a norm of substantive equality. Distributive justice requires a knowledge of,
and an active concern with, de facto civil rights rather than with abstract
notions of fairness. It must be rooted in the relative social, legal, and economic
positions of the actors in any particular society. While legitimacy and
distributive justice are sometimes synonymous, they may also be contrary,
particularly where there are wide gaps in the socioeconomic or status positions
of the individuals who are governed by such rules. It has been asserted that in
order for there to be an optimal fairness discourse, a society needs "an
ascertainable community of persons self-consciously engaged in a common
moral enterprise."' 79  Given the vast discrepancies in the legal, social,
economic and political positions of people in most societies, a significant
objective of fairness discourse is to achieve a balance between legitimacy and
distributive justice.
In a rights recognition regime, the legitimacy-based fairness discourse is
exposed for what it frequently represents-a bad faith attempt to undermine
black rights. The recurring debates surrounding affirmative action in the United
177. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 8-9
(1995).
178. Id.
179. Franck, supra note 177, at 10-11.
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States and to a lesser extent in Canada, illustrate how legitimacy-based fairness
discourse has permeated many attempts to address institutionalized racial
inequalities. Cries of reverse discrimination have become the mantra of groups
seeking to dismantle gains by blacks and other minorities, all while other forms
of preferential treatment for those in the majority remain in place.' 80 Consider
for example the alumni admissions scheme that has long-existed at United
States colleges and universities, particularly at elite institutions.'
81
Dispositions in which non-black persons are somehow disadvantaged are
not necessarily unfair or exemplary of invidious racial discrimination. As the
Supreme Court of Canada stated in upholding the decision of an African-
Canadian female judge against claims of bias in favor of a black defendant,
"not every favorable or unfavorable disposition attracts the label of bias or
prejudice. For example, it cannot be said that those who condemn Hitler are
biased or prejudiced. This unfavorable disposition is objectively justifiable-in
other words, it is not 'wrongful' or 'inappropriate'.
' 82
In addition, the legitimacy-based fairness question makes one of
twounwarranted assumptions about the nature of rights. It assumes that societal
rights exist in limited quantities and are chips in a zero sum game or slices in a
pie of limited size. Therefore gains for individual black persons via recognition
of their rights necessarily results in losses to individual white people or other
racial groups. This assumption relies upon a belief that rights, both the chips
and the pie of the metaphor, are vested in individual members of the white
majority and cannot be involuntarily alienated via the assertion of a claim to
black rights.
Both of these notions are unfounded, as they wrongly assume that rights
are both fixed in quantity and finitely owned. Moreover, the zero sum view of
rights assumes a welfare economics approach that views the individual as the
basic unit of measurement. The better way of viewing the move to sui generis
black rights is to take a social utilitarian approach that esteems the overall
welfare of communities and societies.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SuI GENERIS BLACK RIGHTS TO NATIONALISM AND
180. Consider for example the "alumni admissions" scheme that has long-existed at United
States colleges and universities, particularly at elite institutions. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN &
DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998). Another example is job preferences given for
persons with local residency in cases where there is a clear tie between wealth and mainstream
racial membership and residence. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW 700 (1996).
181. Consider for example the "alumni admissions" scheme that has long-existed at United
States colleges and universities, particularly at elite institutions. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 180.
182. R. v. RDS (1997) 3 S.C.R. 484 (Can.).
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THE "BLACK WOMAN QUESTION"
Sui generis black rights are related to claims of black nationalism or pan-
Africanism, but not in the sense that sui generis black rights may be seen as a
claim of black statehood, or even as necessarily growing out of such claims.
Rather, sui generis rights are the expression of recognized legal rights for black
within white societies. However, to the extent that sui generis black rights may
be seen as any way akin to a nationalist movement, one of the significant
concerns is how these rights would affect black women.
A. The History of how Black Nationalism Affects the Black Woman Question
Nationalism is the belief that groups of people are bound together by
territorial, cultural, racial or ethnic links. Although it is frequently associated
with a particular nation state, throughout history a number of stateless or even
rootless people have banded together to assert nationalist claims that are based
more on group claims than individual claims. Frequently, nationalism was an
ideological response to some of the social, economic and political uncertainties
of the modem world and was often used by political activists to mobilize
people against their oppressors.
Black nationalism has often been formed in the context of involuntary
servitude and colonial oppression of blacks. Classical black nationalism was
said to develop as early as the 1700's among blacks who sought freedom from
slavery in the United States. 183 The goal of classical black nationalism was the
creation of an autonomous black state and to help forge the ideological bases
for forming such a state. 184 Other incarnations of Black nationalism have for
the most part avoided claims of sovereign nation-statehood and instead focused
on economic, cultural, and social autonomy within societies wherein they often
form minorities. 185 To the extent that such sentiments of unity extended to
African-ancestored people in other places, this brand of black nationalism was
more akin to what has been called pan-Africanism.
8 6
Nationalism has often in history been a source of women's oppression, as
male leaders of such movements sought to subjugate women's concerns to
those of the larger movement. Although much of contemporary scholarship has
ignored the extent to which there is a gendered dimension to nationalist politics
and policies, there are multiple ways in which nationalist constructions present
real and material consequences for women's lives globally.' s7 When looking to
183. WILSON JEREMIAH MOSES, CLASSICAL BLACK NATIONALISM FROM THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO MARCUS GARVEY, 1 (1996).
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. at 14-16.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Gender and Nationalism: Moving Beyond Fragmented Conversations, in WOMEN,
STATES, AND NATIONALISM: AT HOME IN THE NATION 3 (2000).
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the nation as a source of identity, there are significant consequences for
women's particularized claims of agency and identity within the racial or
cultural communities to which they belong.' 88  Nonetheless, gender has
frequently been cited by classical nationalist writers as the attribute least likely
to produce the collective mobilization needed to spur nationalist movements, as
gender is rarely considered to be the stuff of stable collective identities.
18 9
However, the nation as a source of identity is especially problematic for black
women in black nationalist movements because women are asked to align
themselves with various, and potentially conflicting, contingencies.
B. The "Black Woman Question"
The "Woman Question," as it was called in nineteenth century Britain and
the United States, focused attention on men and male social roles, asking
questions about the nature and function of gender, and whether gender should
be a factor in granting or limiting rights such as voting. The central questions
were often similarly political and legal, social and economic, and involved
men's queries about how to respond to women's claims for social inclusion.
The growth of feminism in the last century has, however, resulted in women
scholars claiming the "woman question" as part of their own discourse and re-
defining it to mean giving voice to women's particular concerns.' 90 Black
women have a unique standpoint on society, grounded in their position as
victims of multiple forms of oppression. 191 This multiplicity of oppressions is
the essence of the "black woman question." 192 In the case of sui generis black
188. Sita Ranchod-Nilsson, Gender Struggles for the Nation: Power, Agency, and
Representation in Zimbabwe, in WOMEN, STATES, AND NATIONALISM: AT HOME IN THE NATION,
164-80 (2000).
189. In the simplest and earliest societies, the number and scale of such identities were
relatively limited; but as populations organized themselves into more complex agrarian societies
in a variety of political formations, the number and scale of such identifications multiplied. Where
once gender, age, clan and tribe had provided the chief units of identity, now there were also
village communities, regions, city-states, religious communities and even empires. With the
growing stratification of such societies, classes and status groups (castes, estates, ethnic
communities) also took on vital roles as focuses of identification in many societies. In the modem
era of industrial capitalism and bureaucracy, the number and in particular the scale of possible
cultural identities have increased yet again. Gender and age retain their vitality; class and religious
loyalties continue to exercise their influence; but today, professional, civic and ethnic allegiances
have proliferated, involving ever larger populations across the globe. Above all, national
identification has become the cultural and political norm, transcending other loyalties in scope and
power. ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN UNITY 55, 58
(1992).
190. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829
(1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations On A Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J 39 (1985).
191. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE SEARCH
FOR JUSTICE [hereinafter Fighting Words] 58-59 (1998).
192. See, e.g., JERRY GAFIO WATTS & AMIRI BARAKA, THE POLITICS AND ART OF A BLACK
INTELLECTUAL 346 (2001).
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rights, one significant potential problem is that in addressing the rights deficit
suffered by blacks in Canadian society, the problems specific to black women
will be ignored, or worse, exacerbated. As one scholar has written,
"dismantling any one form of subordination is impossible without dismantling
every other."' 93 Hence, it becomes crucial to query the extent to which black
women and black men are separate political actors, and if they are, to ask how
they might come together to co-produce sui generis black rights.
Black women's oppression in Canada and the United States is often
determined by the intersection of a number of structures. These structures
include white supremacy or the belief in white superiority and black inferiority
and the corresponding institutional discrimination, patriarchy and sexism, and
homophobia and heterosexism. These ideological and structural forms of
oppression have often come together to disadvantage black women more than
their black male counterparts. This is seen, for example, in the fact that work,
both paid and unpaid, is both "raced" and "gendered." Highly educated upper
middle and middle class black women are often employed in lower status jobs
than their black or white male peers of similar educational and skill levels.'
94
Both historically and in more contemporary times, those black women holding
professional jobs were usually employed in jobs that have evolved as
"women's work", and which required nurturing, caring, or other "womanly"
skills, such as teaching or nursing. 195 Poor and working class black women
with less education and fewer skills are often relegated to low paying jobs, or
excluded from the paid job market altogether. Black women's net societal
disadvantage is also seen in the implementation of the "war on drugs". Since
the mid-1980s, Black women's drug offense incarceration rate has risen over
800 percent, as they frequently became frontline casualties in the war on
drugs. 196
Black women also frequently face domestic violence and sexual abuse
that is informed and shaped by class and patriarchal structures. For example,
poor women in general, and particularly poor black women, are significantly
more likely to be victims of sexual violence than white women.1 97 Because
193. Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991).
194. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical
Evidence Of A Double Standard In Law School Hiring Of Minority Women, 65 S. CALIF. L. REV.
2299 (1992) (discussing the sex-based disadvantage of minority women law faculty as seen for
example in their disproportionate employment in lower-tiered schools than white and male
colleagues with the same or lesser credentials).
195. Linda Carty, African-Canadian Women and the State, in PEGGY BRISTOL ET. AL ED.
WE'RE ROOTED HERE AND THEY CAN'T PULL US UP: ESSAYS IN AFRICAN CANADIAN WOMEN'S
HISTORY 205 (1994).
196. See generally Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, Drug Couriers at the Borders of
Canadian Sentencing 56 UNIV. TORONTO L. REV. 285 (2007).
197. TRACI C. WEST, WOUNDS OF THE SPIRIT: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND
RESISTANCE ETHICS (1999).
70 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LAW & POLICY [VOL. IX: 1
black women are often seen as sexually promiscuous, this stereotype has often
served to justify sexual violence against them and has played a negative role in
how black women are treated within health facilities and by the courts.'
98
Additionally, Black women often face dramatically worse health issues than
white women or males of any race, and are frequently among the most
educationally disadvantaged in society.'
99
Part of what is troubling to claims of black collective rights such as sui
generis black rights is that black women's oppression sometimes comes from
within their own communities. Black men are sometimes complicit in or evenS200
authors of black women's oppression. This has been true despite black men
demanding from black women racial solidarity in the face of white
oppression, 20 1 and active service as workers for "racial uplift. '20 2 As one
scholar has suggested, in order to achieve racial progress for blacks, many in
the black community thought it was important to overcome stereotypes of the
highly sexualized black woman to demonstrate that black women were the
moral and maternal equals of white women. 203 This "racial uplift rhetoric"
often promoted the concept of "universal womanhood", ignoring the
differences in the experiences of black and white, women, and the differences
in black men and women, all while urging black singularity.2°
Moreover, asking the "black woman question" in such a context raises not
only concerns about the rights of black women, but about the rights of black
men, since the black woman question implicates more generally the notion of
gendered racism. Gendered racism, or the racism structured by racist
designations of gender roles, exists not only as an outgrowth of feminism.
20 5
Rather, gendered racism is equally tied to an understanding of comparative
• . 206
racism across cultures, through colonialism and neocolonialism. Because of
this multi-focal approach, gendered racism affects black men's identities as
much as black women's identities.
Because of the peculiar interactions of gender and race in Canada and the
United States, black men are frequently constructed as violence prone citizens,
207
absentee fathers, and criminals. As one scholar writes, these negative
stereotypes have functioned since the nineteenth century and continue to
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Evelyn M. Hammonds, Toward a Genealogy of Black Female Sexuality, in FEMINIST
GENEALOGIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES, DEMOCRATIC FuTURES 170, 176 (1996).
201. Collins, supra note 191, at 25.
202. See, e.g., Karen Adler, Always Leading Our Men in Service and Sacrifice: Amy Garvey,
Feminist Black Nationalist, 6 GENDER & SOCIETY 346 (1992).
203. ALISON BERG, MOTHERING THE RACE 44 (2002).
204.1d.
205. VANAJA DHRUVARAJAN & JILL VICKERS, GENDER, RACE, AND NATION 63 (2002).
206. PHILOMENA ESSED, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY RACISM 31 (1991).
207. Id.
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"overdetermine" the identities that black males are permitted to create for
themselves, 208 as black men fall victim to societal notions by adopting many of
the pernicious behaviors attributed to them. Just as these negative stereotypes
may result in pernicious behaviors, efforts to counter the stereotypes may
equally shape black male behaviors. Black men who are viewed as successful
in familiar contexts, that is, those who are depicted in both fictional and
nonfiction public discourses as meeting broad white approval, often do so by
not just embracing the norms of patriarchy seen in white communities by
taking one of two routes: becoming a "super-patriarch"-embodying the ideal
of a controlling, oppressive father and husband via an uncritical embrace of
patriarchy, 20 9 or becoming an "emasculated, buffoon-like hausfraus"'2 1 who
submits meekly to the demands of a supercharged Sapphire-like2 11 wife. 212 As
one scholar has noted, gendered racism is a subset of a larger set of racial codes
most Whites use, often in the form of a complex and nuanced racial-gender
discourse, all in the service of oppressive racist practices that subjugate both
black men and women.
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C. Womanist Thought as a Remedy for the "Black Woman's Question and
Gendered Oppression
Given the multiple forms of black women's oppression and the operation
of gendered racism that effects and distorts the roles of both black men and
women within the black community, the co-production of sui generis black
rights becomes reliant upon a harmonization of black normativity.
In response to the multiple forms of oppression that plagued black
208. BELL HOOKS, WE REAL COOL: BLACK MEN AND MASCULINITY, xii (2003).
209. Id. at 55.
210. ELIZABETH ALEXANDER, REPRESENTING BLACK MEN 160 (1995).
211. Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, The Peculiar Treatment of African American
Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 626 (2000) the authors describe
the Sapphire as follows:
In the stereotype of Sapphire, African American women are portrayed as evil, bitchy, stubborn
and hateful. In other words, Sapphire is everything that Mammy is not. "The Sapphire image has
no specific physical features other than the fact that her complexion is usually brown or dark
brown." Unlike other images that symbolize African American women, Sapphire necessitates the
presence of an African American male. The African American male and female are engaged in an
ongoing verbal duel. Sapphire was created to battle the corrupt African American male whose
"lack of integrity, and use of cunning and trickery provides her with an opportunity to emasculate
him through her use of verbal put-downs."
Ernestine Ward popularized the Sapphire image in the Amos and Andy television series.
Ward played a character known as Sapphire, and her husband, Kingfish, was played by Tim
Moore. Sapphire's spiteful personality was primarily used to create sympathy in viewers for
Kingfish specifically and African American males in general. As a result, many African American
women suppress these feelings of bitterness and rage for fear of being regarded as a Sapphire. Id
at 638.
212. Alexander, supra note 210, at 160.
213.YANICK ST. JEAN, DOUBLE BURDEN: BLACK WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RACISM 17
(1998).
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women, womanist theories and philosophies have been formed. Womanist
thought is an expression of black feminism that is both race and gender
214
conscious. While womanist thought grows out of the black female
experience, it does not exclude black men or women of other races. 215 Rather,
a womanist view is "committed to survival and wholeness of entire people,
male and female." 216 Hence, a significant concern of womanist beliefs would
be the extent to which sui generis black rights would ensure rights not just for
black men but for black women as well since any such movement, to be an
authentic and full expression of black collective consciousness, would have to
take into account the struggles particular to both genders.
The concept of black citizens being outside judicial norms was a well
established attribute of the common law. In the American and Canadian
colonies, it was common to bar blacks, either slave or free, from bringing suits
in court or testifying. There are consequently, few instances of blacks in early
Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American jurisprudence appearing as parties,
claimants, or predecessors in interest in cases. Generally, before United States
slavery ended, blacks were seen in court only as the subjects of lawsuits: as
property subject to ownership. 2 17 After slavery ended, there was hope that
blacks would finally have access to the courts as litigants vindicating their
rights to equal treatment. Plessy vs. Ferguson21 8 crushed those hopes. There is
no doubt that Plessy heralded in a period when the law served as the willing
tool of United States racists.
2 19
Ironically, however, Plessy might also be viewed as the harbinger of
positive black difference as much as it might be read as the death knell for post
Civil War black civic equality. In such a perspective, while mandatory
segregation clearly undermined black access to social and economic goods, it
also promoted black autonomy and collective self-help. A large body of
scholarship has, in recent years, begun to re-think what has been characterized
as assimilationist thinking in order to consider the phenomenon of black
reliance on black resources, rather than white benevolence to construct the
220foundations of free black life in the United States. More than just the
response of being excluded from white establishments, blacks sought a unique
214. The term womanist was coined by writer Alice Walker. See ALICE WALKER, IN
SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS: WOMANIST PROSE (1983).
215. MICHAEL AWKWARD, NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE: RACE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS
OF POSITIONALITY (1995).
216. Id.
217.DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICA LAW 11 (1980) (citing H. CATERALL,
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO, VOLS. I-V (1936)).
218. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
219. The period following Plessy has been called the "nadir" of black life in America. See
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sense of freedom premised on self-esteem and citizenship within the
community, a freedom that was no less valuable despite its illegitimate birth as
the child of racist-imposed segregation.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of dejure segregation and of the most virulent anti-black
racism, many scholars have observed that the organizing principles of black
uniqueness, self-worth and esteem have fallen away, seen as so-much detritus
to be washed away in the post-racial deluge. Embracing black difference via
black sui generis rights is the only way to reverse this trend.
